37 years ago, Major League Baseball held the last of four largely ill-fated free agent compensation drafts that were conducted from 1982 to 1985. Famously, the Toronto Blue Jays plucked Tom Henke from the Texas Rangers, obtaining an instrumental piece of their future contending teams in the shutdown closer at the end of the bullpen that they had long sought.
What isn’t usually mentioned is the huge stroke of good fortune involved in them landing Henke, because he was not their first pick. That instead was reliever Donnie Moore of the Atlanta Braves, and it was only because the Angels had priority over the Jays and thus got Moore that the Jays had to settle for Henke. In fact, so unheralded or even undesired was Henke that the Jays immediately turned around and sent him outright off the 40-man roster that same day.
The broader historical context around the Henke is interesting, so what follows is an overview of the free agent compensation draft generally, the 1985 compensation draft specifically, what the Jays were doing that winter, and the aftermath for the involved parties.
When free agency was negotiated in the 1976 collective agreement, it was a very different system than we’re familiar with today. Until it was abolished in the 1985 collective agreement, every November there was a “free agent re-entry draft” in which teams drafted the rights to negotiate with free agents, and free agents could only sign with teams who drafted them.
In addition to that restriction, the owners had insisted on compensation for losing a free agent, wanting a system like what existed in the NFL where teams selected a player off the roster of the other team. It had the effect of greatly disincentivizing pursing free agents and diminishing player movement, and accordingly was a non-starter for the MLBPA. The compromise that draft pick compensation, whereby a signing team would lose its first round pick to the former team (second round pick if in the top half).
That did little to restrain the free agent market and, with salaries exploding, the biggest priority for owners in the next agreement was securing stronger compensation. The MLBPA was equally adamant about not having direct compensation in the form of major league players, and the stalemate resulted in the two month strike of June/July 1981.
The compromise that ended the strike was a convoluted system for compensation in which players would be ranked statistically (by the Elias Sports Bureau), with the top 20% at a position designated type A, and the next 10% Type B. Compensation was as follows:
- Type A free agent: the signing team’s top draft pick plus a pick from the compensation pool
- Type B free agent: the signing team’s top draft pick, plus a special supplemental pick at the end of the first round (what became known as sandwich picks)
- Unranked free agent: the signing team’s top draft pick only
In all cases, the former team only received the other team’s draft pick if the player was drafted by at least other four teams in the re-entry draft, otherwise it was just the other element of compensation (of none in the case of an unranked player).
The compensation pool was drawn from all teams after they had protected 26 players from their organizations, or 24 if they had signed a Type A free agent. Up to five teams could opt out of signing any Type A free agents for three years and having t contribute to the pool (seven teams applied, the Jays not among them; the Red Sox, Angels, Dodgers, Twins and Mariners were chosen by lot). A team losing a player got $150,000 from a central fund, and were no longer eligible to contribute to future pools.
One final point about the compensation pool relates to Henke. It is frequently said that the Jays took him from Texas with their pick because Texas had signed Cliff Johnson from them. But this was purely co-incidental; the MLBPA only begrudgingly agreed to the compensation pool in the first place because it link signing a player to losing. In fact, it was the only time that a team signing a free agent lost a player through the pool.
The White Sox were the only team to lose a 1981 Type A free agent (Ed Farmer), and chose catcher Joel Skinner from Pittsburgh in return. The next year there were two, with the White Sox losing Steve Kemp and the Mariners losing Brian Bannister. The White Sox again failed to get any impact, selecting Steve Mura from St. Louis, but Seattle was shrewder and nabbed long time future big leaguer Danny Tartabull from Cincinnati’s system.
But it was in January 1984 that all hell broke loose with the system. After the Jays signed Type A free agent Dennis Lamp, the White Sox were again entitled to choose from the pool. The Mets had gambled and left 39-year-old Tom Seaver unprotected given his large salary, but that did not deter the White Sox and the selection of an all-time great sent shockwaves through baseball and especially New York.
A couple weeks later, Tom Underwood signed with Baltimore and Oakland was entitled to a pick. They selected pitcher Tim Belcher from the Yankees, an uber-prospect who had just been the first overall pick in the January draft (and had not signed with Minnesota as the first overall pick of the June 1983 draft). They exploited a loophole in that he had just signed the week previously, after the Yankees had to submit their protection list (for the White Sox pick). So the Yankees lost a player they literally could not protect.
These two picks turned sentiment against the compensation pool—this was the result teams had endured a 50-day strike to achieve? Not surprisingly, after 1985 the compensation pool was done away, replaced by the system of compensation that endured with just small tweaks until 2012 when it in turn was replaced by the qualifying offer system.
In any event, by 1985 teams were paying a lot closer attention to their lists. Nonetheless, Atlanta opted not to protect reliever Donnie Smith, who had posted a 2.94 ERA in 1984, as he was demanding a huge raise in arbitration (and they had shelled out huge bucks for Bruce Sutter).
That was no obstacle for the Jays, who were desperate to upgrade the bullpen to challenge Detroit in the AL East and their backend of Willie Hernandez, Aurelio Lopez and Doug Bair. In December they had moved Dave Collins and Alfredo Griffin for Bill Caudill to be their closer, despite him being in line for over a million dollars in arbitration.
But they were not the only team drafting. In the 1984 offseason, there were five free agents rated Type A. Rick Thornton (Cubs) and Andre Thornton (Cleveland) re-signed. Bruce Sutter (Cardinals) and Fred Lynn (Angels) were bona fide stars, so it was no surprise they ranked as Type A. Cliff Johnson was a 37-year-old platoon DH with just 899 PA the previous two years, but that platooning had made him very productive (137 wRC+) and he qualified as Type A.
Being a DH limited Johnson’s market, and in fact only three other teams drafted his negotiating rights (Orioles, Rangers, White Sox) in addition to the Jays retaining them. That meant the Jays were not eligible to receive a first round pick from the singing team, just a pick from the pool. The Jays wanted Johnson back, but balked at going beyond one year guaranteed. When Texas ponied up two years and more money ($1.5-million guaranteed vs. $600,000) as well as the opportunity to play everyday, he was gone.
The precise procedure of the compensation draft actually wasn’t really a draft, in terms of being sequential picks. The 17 teams contributing to the pool submitted their protection lists by January 16th, the three selecting weeks had a week to review them, and then all three teams submitted the name they wanted simultaneously.
If multiple teams too the same player, priority was determined by how teams had drafted the free agent they had lost. Thus St. Louis (Sutter was drafted by six teams) had priority over California (Lynn by five) over Toronto (Johnson by three). In terms of Moore, the Cardinals were not an issue, choosing minor league shortstop Angel Salazar from the Expos (according to their GM the 27th player they would have protected).
But California also selected Moore, and thus were awarded him, leaving the Jays to pivot to Henke. This was viewed as a surprising pick, even skeptically in the media, given the number of veterans available and Henke’s modest 4.20 ERA in 60 career innings. But that didn’t matter to Gillick, telling Allan Ryan of the Toronto Star, “you’re looking at the stats, that’s all you’re looking at,” and the Globe and Mail, “We scout tools. We don’t scout statistics…we were shocked he was available.”
Those tools? “He’s got an outstanding arm, a good live fastball” Gillick told Ryan, and was certainly proved right.
Two days after getting Henke, the Jays went out and added another veteran arm to the bullpen to complement Caudill, acquiring Gary Lavelle from San Francisco and giving him a contract extension. Perhaps had they got Moore, they wouldn’t have done that. Caudill and Lavelle both produced decent results in 1985, but were expensive flops thereafter. Meanwhile, Henke came up midway through 1985 and seized the closer’s role. Of the three relief acquisitions, it was the least heralded and costly who was the biggest factor in 1985 and over the long-run.
For his part, Moore wasn’t exactly a pumpkin either. He posted a 1.92 ERA in 103 innings in 1985, and was very good in 1986 before giving up a crucial home run to Dave Henderson in the ALCS. He battled injuries thereafter and declined, and committed suicide in July 1989 after shooting his wife three times following an argument.
